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(Editor's note: This essay by Ben Blanks is the winner of the North Award for the best paper in 
the 2012 Agora. Ben presented an earlier version of this paper at the ACTC Student Conference 
at Pepperdine University in Malibu, California, in March, 2011.)
When reading the Apology and the Crito of Plato, one inevitably comes upon a seeming 
fundamental contradiction between the two dialogues. The Apology presents readers with a 
defiant Socrates who declares in his trial that, if acquitted on the condition that he never 
philosophize again, he would continue to practice philosophy in spite of the jury's order to the 
contrary:
. . . if you said to me in this regard: "Socrates, we do not believe Anytus now; we acquit 
you, but only on condition that you spend no more time on this investigation and do not 
practice philosophy, and if you are caught doing so you will die"; if, as I say, you were to 
acquit me on those terms, I would say to you: "Men of Athens, I am grateful and I am 
your friend, but I will obey the god rather than you, and as long as I draw breath and am 
able, I shall not cease to practice philosophy . . . (29c-d).1 
The passage from the Apology seems to present a defiant argument for civil disobedience in the 
face of injustice. In the Crito, however, when given a chance to escape prison and his upcoming 
execution, Socrates reasons that such an action would be unjust because it would defy the laws
1Plato, Apology. Trans. G. M. A. Grabe (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 32.
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of the city. Near the end of the dialogue Plato presents Socrates as speaking for a hypothetical 
anthropomorphized "voice of the laws":
Is your wisdom such as not to realize that your country is to be honored more than your 
mother, your father, and all your ancestors, that it is more to be revered and more 
sacred, and that it counts for more among the gods and sensible men, that you must 
worship it, yield to it, and placate its anger more than your father's? You must either 
persuade it or obey its orders, and endure in silence whatever it instructs you to endure, 
whether blows or bonds, and if it leads you into war to be wounded or killed, you must 
obey. To do so is right, and one must not give way or retreat or leave one's post, but 
both in war and in courts everywhere else, one must obey the commands of one's city 
and country, or persuade it as to the nature of justice (51b-c).2 
In this passage Plato seems to present the reader with a very different Socrates from that of the 
Apology. Socrates here claims that, if one fails to get an unjust law repealed, then one must 
either submit to the law or leave if legally able; the passage leaves no room for the supposed 
civil disobedience of the Apology. This apparent contradiction has generated considerable 
scholarly debate and has produced several hypothetical problems in addition to that which lies 
within the texts. The primary issue essentially becomes whether Socrates would have 
sanctioned civil disobedience.
The answer to the question may lie in a close examination of historical events and the 
legal system of the time of Socrates' trial. Some scholarly analysis, such as Brickhouse and 
Smith, suggests that the defiance passage in the Apology may not have been a true reflection of
2 Plato, Crito. trans. G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 51.
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Socratic philosophy because it did not show an actual intent to openly disobey the Athenian 
laws of the time. The conditional acquittal that Socrates proposes would not have been legal 
at the time, so Socrates was most likely being inflammatory in this instance rather than 
legitimately philosophical. The Apology passage, therefore, does not contradict the Crito 
because it probably was not meant to be taken as a legitimate threat of disobedience to the 
Athenian legal system. The dismissal of the Apology passage, however, does not mean that one 
can dismiss the question of civil disobedience in Socrates' philosophy. Rather, it clears the 
debate considerably. If the Apology passage is shown to have been made in defiance of an 
illegal court procedure, then the Apology passage cannot be taken as evidence of Socratic 
support of civil disobedience. Such evidence, coupled with the obedience to law proscribed in 
the Crito, allows the supposed contradiction between the two dialogues to be dismissed.
In order to analyze the Apology and the Crito in relation to each other, one must first 
make an assumption that has not been proven to any significant extent. One must assume that 
the Socrates character within the two dialogues is both consistent and trustworthy in espousing 
philosophical arguments. By accepting this assumption, one can evaluate the inconsistencies 
within the two Socratic dialogues as if they were a complete, consistent whole. Following such 
an assumption, one can examine the philosophy in the Apology in relation to that within the 
Crito with logical bearing.
In order to understand the seeming contradiction between the two works, one must 
understand the passages on which it is based. The defiance passage of the Apology, when 
interpreted literally, does indeed seem to contradict the obedience to the state espoused in the 3
3 Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Plato’s Socrates (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 145­146.
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Crito. In the passage, Socrates declares that, if given a choice between obeying the 
hypothetical court mandate and the god's orders (practicing philosophy), he would choose the 
latter option. This statement has been cited as evidence for Socrates' supposed support of civil 
disobedience against the state. A closer examination of the context of the quote, however, 
yields a very different conclusion. In their work Plato's Socrates, Thomas C. Brickhouse and 
Nicholas D. Smith argue that the laws of Athens would not have legally allowed for the 
conditional acquittal that Socrates proposes; furthermore, they suggest that Socrates would 
probably have known about the legality of such an action when he included the hypothetical in 
his defense.4 If one supposes then, that Socrates understood the illegal nature of the 
conditional acquittal, the motivation behind this defense strategy then comes into question. If 
he gave the speech in the passage knowing full well of the hypothetical acquittal's illegality, 
then one may assume that he gave the speech as an incendiary to show his contempt for those 
bringing charges against him. By inflammatorily suggesting an illegal outcome to the trial, 
Socrates may have hoped to call into question the truthfulness of the charges against him and 
to indirectly suggest that his accusers were corrupt enough to hold unlawful court proceedings. 
If this argument were recognized as a provocation, then one can no longer argue that the 
passage of the Apology espouses civil disobedience in the face of the laws (however unjust) of 
the state. Rather, the passage could then be understood to represent an act of inflammatory 
defiance towards illegal, illegitimate court mandates.
Although qualifying the Apology passage seems to solve the problem inherent in the 
supposed contradiction between the Apology and the Crito, it brings another problem. As
4 Brickhouse and Smith, Plato’s Socrates, 145-146.
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shown by Richard Kraut in his work Socrates and the State, one must still consider the question 
of how Socrates would react to a legally binding law against philosophy5. Brickhouse and Smith 
argue that Socrates would not feel the need to follow such a law because it would come in 
conflict with the older Athenian law that barred against impiety6. However, improbable as it 
may seem, one must still consider whether Socrates would obey a law prohibiting the practice 
of philosophy if the law against impiety were repealed. His argument in the Crito seems to 
disallow for any possibility of civil disobedience in the face of an upstanding law, even if it were 
unjust. In the Crito passage, Socrates claims that, when faced with a law that one disagrees 
with, one has three possible responses: first, one can dispute the law and attempt to get it 
repealed; second, one can leave the city rather than break the law; third, one can stay in the 
city and be forced to obey the law. Taking this passage into consideration, one must conclude 
that, if faced with a law that prohibited practicing philosophy, Socrates would choose to 
attempt to get the law repealed. If he failed, then he would then stay in Athens and be forced 
to obey it. He would probably not choose to leave the city because he clearly discounts exile 
from Athens as an option in his choice of counter-penalties near the end of the Apology (37c- 
e)7.
If a reader ceases to classify the Apology passage as a statement supporting civil 
disobedience, then he or she is forced to accept Socrates' professed subordination to the 
Athens' laws. Such an acceptance, however, may come with unintended consequences. After 
ceding the point, one could argue that Socrates supported obedience to the state as an
5 Richard Kraut, Socrates and the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 16.6 Brichouse and Smith, Plato’s Socrates, 147.7 Plato, Apology, 39.
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essential quality for the just person; he or she would be right. Nevertheless, it does not follow 
that Plato meant for Socrates to espouse injustice in favor of the state. One must remember 
that Socrates spoke of the Athenian state in the Crito passage, a state that, while imperfect, 
was, in his mind, more just and legitimate than a state based on tyranny without moral 
guidance. The civil obedience that he spoke of addressed not how one should respond to 
unjust tyranny, but how one should manage one's autonomy in the face of restrictive laws. His 
argument, then, would have applied more to a speeding driver in suburban America than to a 
resistance fighter in Nazi-controlled France. Socrates saw society's laws as a nurturing force in 
its citizens' lives, similar to a parent's gentle care for his or her children. To him, disobedience 
meant more than a disruptive affront; it meant espousing a behavior that, taken to the 
absolute, negated the possibility of a government's continual existence. The Socrates of the 
Apology and the Crito did not argue against autonomy, but against its intentionally destructive 
abuse in society.
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